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2Risk-Taking Tendencies and Fixed Salary/Commission Rates in Salesforce
Compensation Arrangements: A Prospect-Agency- Theoretical Perspective
An analytical model for risk taking tendencies in salesforce compensation arrangements is
developed that takes into account fixed salary levels and commission rates. The model
demonstrates that a salesperson's preference for a particular compensation contract is
contingent on hislher anticipated level of total compensation (fixed salary plus commission-
based compensation) and hislher degree of loss aversion. The conceptualisation differs from
known models and is based on an integration of agency and prospect theory.
Keywords: salesmanagement,salesforceremuneration,agencytheory
Introduction
The basic structure of salesforce remuneration arrangements can be either based on straight
salary or straight commission only, or on a combination of both. Such arrangements have
been explained theoretically using agency theoretic frameworks (e.g. Krafft, 1999; Srinivasan
and Lal, 1993). The analogy of salesforce relationships to relationships analyzed in agency
theory lies in viewing salespeople as agents who sell on behalf of organizations which are
their principals. The focus of resultant arrangements between salespeople and their
organizations in uncertain environments is on designing risk-sharing contracts, that are
characterized by agents who are believed to have more information than principals, in order to
minimize those costs to the principal that are caused through an agent who is believed to be
motivated by self-interest.
While agency theory is built on rationality and self-interest, from behavioural psychological
suggests that individuals do not necessarily behave rationally. As such behaviour of
salespeople in salesforce relationships cannot necessarily be assumed to be rational. Several
empirical findings demonstrate that agency theoretic assumptions and associated predictions
for salesforce compensation arrangements do not hold under all circumstances. For example,
Krafft (1999) and Lal, Outland and Staelin (1994) found that salespeople are not necessarily
risk averse and more specifically, Albers and Krafft (1992) found that only 30 percent of
salespeople are risk averse whereas 40 percent are risk neutral and 30 percent risk seeking.
Moreover, contrary to agency theory predictions, Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) and Krafft
(1999) found that salespeople facing higher environmental uncertainty do not necessarily have
a higher proportion of straight salary, as agency theoretic models would predict it. Further,
there seems to be no empirical study which shows that salespeople intend to maximize their
utility, but notwithstanding among practitioners it is assumed that salespeople have specific
anticipated levels of total compensation and that they accordingly determine their overall level
of effort to accomplish their anticipated level of total compensation. Those findings indicate
that agency theory predictions that are based on agents that behave according to utility theory
are not necessarily always accurate. Hence, traditional agency theoretic models are limited in
predicting fixed salary components and commission rates in salesforce arrangements.
In this paper it proposed that a salesperson's behaviour can be examined in a prospect
theoretic framework. Such an integration of agency theory and prospect theory synthesizes
constructs from both the field of behavioural psychology and the field of economics to obtain
a more realistic framework for understanding salesforce compensation arrangements. The aim
is to develop predictions according to this integrative framework. More specifically, the
objective is (1) to specify the structures of compensation arrangements that are more likely to
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3be accepted by salespeople and (2) to determine a compensation arrangement that is likely to
optimise an organization's objectives. These predictions are assumed to improve the external
validity and explanatory completeness of marketing theory for salesforce compensation
agreements.
Salesforce Dependent Profits
We consider a setting wherein a salesperson creates profits for an organization based on costs
reductions and revenue increases. We distinguish gross profits, TIG, and net profits, TIN.
Gross profits are enhanced through costs reductions [improved profit margin, a (e.g.,
efficiencies based on salesperson effort)], increases in revenues, R [e.g., sales effectiveness
based on salesperson effort], or both. Net profits are the difference between gross profits and
total remuneration, c, to the salesperson. This can be formally stated as:
TIN = a R - c [1]
with: TIN = TIG- c [2]
ilG = a R [3]
In this paper, we assume that profit margins are fixed and not influenced by a salesperson.
Accordingly, an organization's net profits depend on revenues and total remuneration to the
salesperson. In a salesforce context, revenues are modelled as a function of the agent's effort,
b. Total remuneration to the salesperson consists of a fixed salary component, Cr, and a
commission-based component, c., The latter component is contracted on gross profits, as
those are observable. For ease in exposition, we assume that the amount of commission-based
payments is linear in gross profits. This assumption is consistent with prior work that shows
that linear relationships may be optimal in dynamic settings (e.g., Srinivasan and Lal, 1993).
Hence, total remuneration is:
c =cr+J!ar3b [4]
with: c = cr+ c, [5]
c, = J!TIG for 0 < J!s 1 [6]
R = r3b for r3> 0 [7]
where, J!= commission rate, and r3= productivity of agent effort.
Substituting Rand c in Equation 1 by the terms in equations 4 and 7 allows us to model net
profits as follows:
TIN=ar3b-(cr+J!ar3b) or [8]
TIN = (I-J!) a r3b - Cr [9]
The fixed salary component has the inherent properties of adverse selection and moral hazard
in the relationship between the salesperson and the organization. As suggested in traditional
agency theoretic models, an organization would try to reduce the fixed salary component as to
not overpay the salesperson, if gross profits are not maximized. However, the principal has
to design a compensation structure in which the fixed salary and commission-based
components are acceptable to the salesperson.
Salespeople Preferences
Here, we propose that salespeople form their preferences for a given compensation structure
based on prospect theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A salesperson's perceived
foreseen state of well-being at the time of evaluating a remuneration arrangement is
characterized by his/ her reference point: a reference point that, we propose, represents the
3
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function suggests that a salesperson who has secured a level of income below hislher
anticipated level of total income has a greater risk-taking tendency, whereas the same one,
when he/she has secured an income level above the anticipated total level of remuneration is
likely to be risk averse.
For salespeople who only receive straight fixed salary component their anticipated level of
total remuneration will be equal to that fixed salary component. Whereas, for those who
receive a fixed salary component plus a commission-based component or commission-based
component only their anticipated total level of remuneration will be based on their judgment
of an aggregation of their fixed salary component and their probable commission-based
component. We argue that the difference between the level of fixed salary and anticipated
total remuneration manifests a loss for the salesperson. Thus, salespeople who have a level of
secured income below their anticipated total level of income perceive a loss and, accordingly,
are likely to take greater risk, whereas those who have generated income levels above their
anticipated levels perceive a gain and are likely to avoid risk. This might explain some
empirical findings of Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) and Krafft (1999) that unveiled that
salespeople facing higher environmental uncertainty do not necessarily have a higher
proportion of straight salary, as traditional agency theoretic models would predict it.
As has been taken into account in previous studies, we will analyse both a salesperson's utility
for remuneration and for effort expended to the selling task. We will now state these value
functions [ve(c) for remuneration and vb(b) for effort]; taking into account a value function
with a reference point, RP, and a loss aversion I, standardized to the interval [-1, I] with n as a
standardization parameter and z, for z > 0, representing z = 2 'In(~ - 1) , with k as a parameter
capturing the diminishing sensitivity of the function. k expresses the marginal increase in
perceived value for k in the interval [0.5, 1]. Ifk = 1, the value function has a linear shape
(von Nitzsch, 1998).
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where, ve(c) = perceived value for remuneration, Cf = fixed salary level, c, = anticipated total
remuneration, l, = loss aversion parameter [compensation function], n, = standardization
parameter [compensation function], and z, = diminishing sensitivity parameter [remuneration
function].
, if Cf~ c,





where, cb(b) = perceived value [reduction] for effort expended, br = effort which corresponds
to fixed salary level, be = anticipated total effort expended, Ib= loss aversion parameter [effort
function], nb = standardization parameter [effort function], Zb = diminishing sensitivity
parameter [effort function] .
Optimisation Problem
Assuming that the salesperson gets a fixed salary component for b = 0, any reduction in value
for additional effort devoted must be matched by an equal or greater increase in value for
remuneration received. As such, the aggregation of an increase in value for remuneration
received and reduction of value for additional effort expended must be equal or greater than
the aggregation of the perceived value for an initial remuneration (fixed salary cr) and initial
effort expended (b = 0). This constraint can be stated as follows:
v( c, b) ~ v ( Cr, 0)
For an organization this would be optimal, if the values are equal. Thus, we can re-write this
constraint as:
v, ( C ) + vs ( b ) = v, ( c-) + vb ( 0 )
or v: ( C ) - v, ( cr) = Vb( 0 ) - Vb( b )
This is the only constraint that the organization has to take into account for designing an
optimal compensation arrangement structure. This can be formalized as follows:
Max(fIG - c) subjectto [10]
v, ( C ) - Ve ( Cr) = Vb( 0 ) - Vb( b )
The reference points Ce and be allow for eight (23) combinations of (cr, c, b) as each parameter
can be below or above the reference point. Here, we assume that Cr < c. This, in tum, makes
the two combinations with Cr being greater than c, and c being lower Ce infeasible. Hence, for
the examination of the influence of the parameters ce, Cr, z, and l, on f..lfor given values of the
parameters c, De, Zb,nb, Iband b we assume that Cr is below ce, c is above c, and b is above be.












Equation 13 shows that the commission rate, J.l, decreases with increasing levels of fixed
salary. Assuming that the anticipated total remuneration is known to the organization, a
remuneration arrangement - combination of commission rate and fixed salary component -
needs to decided upon that will optimise net profits. We will now substitute J.l in equation
[10] by the right term in equation [13]. This allows us to state the optimisation problem as
follows:
MaxC(I- f.l)af3b) -c f
or
[ [ [ {
(
b--b Jl-exp -Zb --'
Max afJb-c, + ~ln l-{l-{l-exp{-z.)) l+/b ( n;
Zc l-exp -Zb
[14]




An analytical model for risk taking tendencies in salesforce compensation arrangements is
developed that takes into account fixed salary levels and commission rates. The model
demonstrates that a salesperson's preference for a particular compensation contract is
contingent on hislher anticipated level of total compensation (fixed salary plus commission-
based compensation) and hislher degree of loss aversion. Moreover, our model allows
calculating an optimal level of fixed salary for a given anticipated level of total remuneration.
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